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ABSTRACT: Drink driving causes great suffering and material destruction. 
The alcohol interlock promises to eradicate this problem by technological 
design. Traditional counter-measures to drink driving such as policing and 
punishment and information campaigns have proven insufficient. Extensive 
policing is expensive and arguably intrusive. Severe punishment may be 
disproportionate to the risks created in most single cases. If the interlock 
becomes inexpensive and convenient enough, and if there are no convincing 
moral objections to the device, it may prove the only feasible as well as the 
only justifiable solution to the problem of drink driving. Taking this to heart, 
the former Swedish government, supported by the National Road 
Administration and a 2006 final report of the Alcohol Interlock 
Commission, proposed that interlocks should be required as standard 
equipment in all cars. This article assesses two possible moral objections to a 
policy of mandatory interlocks: 1) That it displaces the responsibility of 
individual drivers, and 2) that it constitutes a paternalistic interference with 
drivers. The first objection is found unconvincing, while the second has only 
limited bite and may be neutralized if paternalism is accepted for the sake of 
greater net liberty. If technological development can make mandatory 
interlocks cost-efficient, the proposed policy seems a commendable public 
health measure. 
INTRODUCTION 
Drink driving is a grave public health problem, a top contributing factor behind the 1.26 
million annual deaths in traffic worldwide (WHO, 2004). The alcohol interlock is a novel 
technology that promises to eradicate this problem. Interlocks have been used 
extensively in the US and Canada as a requirement for people convicted of repeated 
drink driving offences. Such requirements are slowly becoming more widespread and 
calls are sometimes heard for a wider use of interlocks (e.g. Wald, 2006). Voluntary 
programs for offenders have been carried out or instigated in Sweden, France, Belgium, 
Finland and Australia (Svensson Smith, Nilsson, Schönning & Sjöström, 2006, pp. 84-
85). 
 The former Swedish government announced that alcohol interlocks would be 
part of the standard equipment in all new cars registered in Sweden by the year 2012. At 
the time of writing the new government has withdrawn their initial commitment to this 
policy, and the public debate is ongoing. A report on the technical, economical, and legal 
aspects of mandatory interlocks was presented by a special commission in the summer of 
2006 (Svensson Smith, Nilsson & Schönning, 2006). The Swedish reform must be 
approved by the European Union before it can come into effect. Already, however, 
interlocks are becoming more and more common in government and commercial 
 vehicles, and are increasingly offered as an alternative to revoked driver’s license for 
offenders. The car manufacturer Volvo recently announced that they will offer integrated 
interlocks as an optional feature for some of their sedan models. While the future of a 
general requirement is uncertain, interlocks are unquestionably becoming an integral part 
of Swedish traffic safety policy.  
 The main focus of this article is on two possible objections to mandatory 
interlocks – that such a requirement inappropriately places the responsibility for sober 
driving with system designers rather than with drivers, and that the policy is a 
paternalistic interference with voluntary risk-taking. We take these issues to be the most 
complex moral issues to be faced by proponents of mandatory interlocks. The two 
objections are closely related and should therefore benefit from shared treatment. In 
order to evaluate the objections, we investigate the concepts of responsibility and 
paternalism as they apply to the case at hand. In the main, we find the objections 
unconvincing and so tentatively commend the Swedish policy. 
 While the discussion is of general relevance, we base our inquiry mainly on 
Swedish data. Sweden has among the least traffic accidents per capita and the least 
instances of drink drivers among highly developed nations. The problem of drink driving 
is greater in other countries and should be a grave concern in practically all countries 
with heavy reliance on the car for transportation. A possible solution to this problem 
should be of general interest. As we shall see, the technical solution offered by the 
interlock may be the only justifiable as well as the only feasible way to seriously diminish 
drink driving. 
 Since drink driving is a controversial issue and since alcohol interlocks are a novel 
technology, we will discuss both the problem and its possible solution in some detail 
before moving on to the core matters of responsibility and paternalism. The second 
section of this article briefly describes the extent of the problem and considers the 
efficiency and moral status of traditional responses – mainly policing and punishment. 
The third section is devoted to describing the interlock, its potential to stop drink driving 
and the more tangible costs involved. In the fourth section, we discuss social and 
individual responsibility and whether and how they can co-exist in the case of mandatory 
interlocks. In the fifth section we discuss whether and how liberty-limiting policies 
involve paternalism and how rejecting or accepting paternalism affects the moral status 
of mandatory interlocks. 
DRINK DRIVING 
Estimating the impact of alcohol on traffic accidents is a complex problem, due in part to 
great variations in police practice and to the susceptibility of autopsy studies to error due 
to lower blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time of death than at the time of 
accident. As a general indication, autopsy studies in some European countries show that 
between 20 and 50 percent of drivers killed in accidents are intoxicated (Austrian Road 
Safety Board, 2003, pp. 14-20). The Swedish Commission on Alcohol Interlocks 
(henceforth the ‘Interlock Commission’) estimates that in 2004 about 108 people were 
 killed and 1450 severely injured in Sweden in accidents caused by drink drivers (being a 
large fraction of alcohol-related accidents more generally). This corresponds to 22.5% of 
all people killed in traffic accidents. The material cost of accidents caused by drink 
drivers (BAC above .2 g/l) in 2004 is estimated to about 1.5 billion Swedish krona 
(~€170 million) (Svensson Smith et. al., 2006, pp. 73-75). This cost includes net loss of 
productive contribution (estimated at 800.000 Swedish krona/death) but not the cost of 
law enforcement, nor costs arising in the justice and penal system. Arguably, the human 
cost is much higher. In the US, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
estimates that over the last years about 17.000 people have been killed yearly in alcohol-
related accidents (where at least one person involved had a BAC above .1 g/l), 
amounting to 40% of the total number of people killed in traffic (National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, 2004, p. 32). The total material cost of these accidents is 
estimated to be about 51 billion dollars (~€38 billion) for the year 2000 (Blincoe, Seay, 
Zaloshnja, Miller, Romano, Luchter & Spicer, 2000, p. 40). 
 In Sweden both the law and the general population consider drink driving a 
serious crime. Driving with a BAC above 1 g/l entails a minimum of one month in 
prison and a maximum of two years (eight years if someone is killed), in addition to 
revoked licence with no right to apply for a new licence for 12 to 36 months. Driving 
with a BAC below 1 g/l but above .2 g/l entails fines or prison for up to six months, plus 
suspended licence for up to 12 months. Though many prison sentences are suspended or 
transformed to community service (Agge, Folkesson & Sjöström, 2002), these 
punishments (or measures) are rather severe compared to Sweden’s comparatively mild 
treatment of offenders generally. Even so, 90% of the population are of the opinion that 
punishments should be harsher and calls for harsher treatment are often heard in the 
public debate. A small majority of the population is also of the opinion that the legally 
accepted BAC should be lowered from the already very low .2 g/l to zero (Swedish 
National Road Administration, June 2006, pp. 4-14). This in spite of the fact that the 
lowering of the concentration from .5 g/l to .2 g/l has had no measurable effect on 
behaviour (Austrian Road Safety Board, 2003, p. 83).  
 In contrast, philosopher Douglas Husak (1994) has argued against regarding 
drink driving a serious offence. Husak points out that most cases of drink driving are not 
mere foolishness with no social utility. Rather, people drive intoxicated for much the 
same reasons they drive sober – mainly to get places. There is neither malicious intent 
nor extreme recklessness (Ibid., pp. 58-60). Husak argues that, risk-wise, drink driving is 
not all that different from other kinds of driving. Though intoxication makes driving 
more dangerous, so does sleepiness, stress and distracting activities such as talking on the 
phone, eating, shaving, reading or applying make-up. None of these other risk-enhancing 
factors are punishable as such, but only if they result in risky driving, which is and should 
be a crime in itself. This discrepancy would perhaps be motivated if intoxication was 
much more likely to cause accidents than was other factors. However, Husak cites 
studies showing that a typical driver with a BAC of 1 g/l is between three and seven 
times more likely to cause an accident than the typical sober driver (Ibid., p. 64). That 
magnitude is not enough, Husak argues, for distinguishing a quite accepted activity such 
 as sober driving from an activity punishable by imprisonment. Husak’s numbers are in 
tune with the classical Borkenstein study of actual crash frequencies at various BACs 
(Borkenstein, Crowther, Shumate, Ziel & Zylman, 1964, p. 165) as well as the similar but 
more recent study by Blomberg, Peck, Moskowitz, Burns & Fiorentino (2005, p. xviii), 
which both assign a multiple of six to seven for the probability of causing an accident at 
BAC 1 g/l. Husak argues further that since the probability of being killed on a five mile 
drive is only one in ten million, even a tenfold increase of this probability must be 
negligible. 
 Husak’s main argument hinges on two comparisons. First, there is the 
comparison between drink driving and sober, non-impaired driving. This comparison 
does not necessarily support the argument. A sixfold or tenfold increase of a small 
probability of grave negative consequences may well be unacceptable and punishable. 
Moreover, to the extent that the risks of sober driving are on a par with those of drink 
driving, that may be an argument against the acceptability of sober driving rather than for 
the acceptability of drink driving. Compared to other modes of transportation, the risks 
of sober driving are substantial. Indeed: ‘The difference in risk between driving while 
intoxicated and driving while sober is less than the difference in risk between driving 
while sober and taking public transportation.’ (Husak, 1994, p. 63) It may be argued that 
sober driving is legal, in spite of the risks involved, because it is socially accepted, rather 
than the other way around. In fact, Husak himself explores this side of the issue in 
another article (2004).  
 Second, there is the comparison between drink driving and impaired driving of 
other kinds. This comparison does support Husak’s argument. Speeding is a contributing 
factor in a comparable number of lethal accidents (about 13.000 yearly in the US). 
However, while it is prohibited, and punished on occasion, neither the social stigma nor 
the legal consequences are nearly as harsh as for drink driving. It may of course be 
argued that rather than relaxing our stance on drink driving, we should start punishing 
other kinds of impaired driving (more harshly). As long as such measures are not taken, 
however, punishing moderate drink driving much more harshly than other kinds of risky 
driving is at least morally problematic. Even extreme drink driving, where the risks are 
much higher than for non-impaired driving, may have equivalents in other kinds of 
behaviour (such as extreme speeding). At high BACs there is also the additional difficulty 
that drink drivers are to a disproportional extent alcoholics and so possibly less 
responsible for their actions. 
 In sum, we find that Husak’s argument shows that punishing drink drivers with 
imprisonment or severe fines is at least morally problematic. Independently of this moral 
problem, there is also a practical problem. Policing and punishment simply have not 
solved the problem, as shown by the numbers surveyed above. The deterrence effect of 
legal prohibition is most tangibly determined by two factors - the severity of punishment 
and the probability of punishment. In the case of drink driving, it seems uncertain whether 
the severity of punishment has any impact, possibly because the probability of detection 
is too low for potential convicts to consider punishment a real possibility (for a 
discussion of other possible explanations, see Houston & Richardson, 2004). Though 
 even this is disputed, it does seem likely that a higher probability of punishment would 
contribute to the deterrence effect (Benson, Mast & Rasmussen, 1999; Austrian Road 
Safety Board, 2003, p. 81-84). Increasing the likelihood of punishment would of course 
require increased policing, which is expensive. More convictions would also entail higher 
costs for administration and prisons. (It would seem rational to at least decrease 
punishments and legal administration and use the savings to increase policing.) 
 The deterrence effect of prohibition is also to a large extent dependent on social 
norms which help shape the subjective probability of detection and punishment. Norms 
also have a direct influence on behaviour independently of prohibition. Apart from 
policing and punishing, the main strategy for reducing drink driving has, quite properly, 
been information campaigns of different kinds. While such campaigns seem to have an 
effect, especially when used in combination with other measures such as increased 
policing (Elder, Ruth, Shults, Sleet, Nichols, Thomson & Rajab, W., 2004), they have 
proved insufficient in solving the problem. In part, this shortcoming is due to the fact 
that those persons that are most likely to drive with high blood alcohol concentrations 
are relatively unaffected by measures based on deterrence and persuasion (Beirness DJ., 
Simpson, Mayhew & Wilson, 1994; Coben & Larkin, 1998).  
 There are of course other possible responses to drink driving beyond affecting 
norms and policing and punishment. Alcoholism and the consumption of alcohol may be 
targeted generally. Bar and restaurant personnel may be trained not to serve people that 
are likely to drive and are approaching a certain degree of intoxication. To reduce 
recidivism specifically, licenses may be revoked, though many who have their licences 
revoked as a result of drink driving keep driving, without a license (Austrian Road Safety 
Board, 2003, pp. 87-88). Convicted drink drivers may be offered treatment for 
alcoholism, though this is expensive. Cars may also be impounded or licence plates 
confiscated, though these measures may affect others than the driver. More proactively, 
doctors may be required to report alcoholics and driver’s licences may be revoked 
preventively, though doctors are reluctant to do so since it undermines trust and is 
considered a breach of confidence (Bjerre, Heed & Kers, 2004).  
 Some of these measures can be fine-tuned. The availability of treatment programs 
for alcoholics involving alcohol interlocks rather than revoked licences would most likely 
increase doctors’ inclination to report alcoholics (in Sweden around 70 times according 
to Bjerre et al., 2004, p. 1818). Recidivism is rather efficiently prevented by requiring 
alcohol interlocks for convicted offenders. However, several studies have shown that 
once the interlock is removed, drivers tend to resume their old patterns of drinking and 
driving (see e.g. Raub, Lucke & Wark, 2003), even if  this tendency can be weakened with 
more comprehensive and more exclusive programs, which include regular medical check-
ups and which expel participants that don’t meet the requirements (Bjerre, 2005). In sum, 
reducing recidivism as well as proactive prevention is most efficient when interlocks are 
used. 
 THE INTERLOCK 
If, for safety reasons, a machine should not be used in a certain way, it is wise to 
incorporate some feature preventing such use into the design of the machine. If cars 
should not be driven by people over a certain BAC, it would be wise to simply prevent 
such use by technical design. The alcohol interlock promises to provide such a safety 
feature. This device measures the driver’s BAC before the car starts, for example through 
an exhalation sample. The interlock is connected to the car’s ignition and if the measured 
concentration is above the maximum set, the car won’t start. With this device installed in 
all cars, drink driving could be virtually eradicated.  
 The interlock is presently in a phase of rapid technological development. As the 
development progresses, detection becomes more and more accurate, and circumvention 
becomes harder. There will always be ways for the smart and skilled to circumvent safety 
features, but as long as the misuse is not widespread, this is not a serious problem. It is 
becoming increasingly difficult to by-pass an interlock breathalyzer by having anything 
other than a human blow air into it. Preventing sober persons from blowing for an 
intoxicated driver is harder. One possibility is additional tests during driving, with failed 
tests leading to gradual shutdown. If this is deemed unsafe, failed test may be registered, 
reported and later prosecuted (safety would probably be optimized by gradual shut down 
at high BACs and merely reporting failed tests at lower concentrations). With a system of 
registration, reporting and the threat of prosecution, interlocks could also come with an 
override feature to be used in emergencies, without encouraging misuse of that feature. 
 Electronic driving licenses would ease the prevention of circumvention. With 
such licences, it could be registered who started a car at any given moment. Technically, 
the licence could be required to stay in the car during driving, making starting a car with a 
borrowed licence more difficult. If only certain persons are required to use interlocks, 
this information could be stored in the licence and accessed by the car. If certain persons 
are exempt from a general requirement (because they cannot breathe normally for 
example), this information can likewise be stored and accessed (Austrian Road Safety 
Board, 2003, pp. 95-96). 
 While a policy of mandatory interlocks would be expensive, there are a number 
of reasons to believe that it would be worthwhile in the long run. The technological 
development of interlocks means that the cost of production is steadily decreasing. The 
higher volumes that would be needed with a general requirement would likely lead to 
economics of scale that would further reduce costs. The Interlock Commission estimates 
that based on the available technology the future cost of having interlocks integrated into 
the basic design of all cars would be SEK 3.000 (~€330) per car yearly. About a third of 
this cost is due to the inconvenience of use (the interlock has to warm up which may 
sometimes take a full minute or more). The total cost for having interlocks in all Swedish 
cars would amount to SEK 14 billion (~€1.6 billion) yearly (Svensson Smith et. al., 2006, 
pp. 91-92). The Swedish National Road Administration (NRA) in an official statement 
(2006:22883, p. 9) regards these estimates as too conservative given the expected 
technological development. Still, as noted above, the annual material cost of accidents 
 caused by drink drivers is only SEK 1.5 billion (~€170 million). On the other hand, the 
human cost should certainly be given some weight, whether it be higher, lower or equal 
to the Interlock Commission’s estimate of SEK 5.5 billion (~€600 million). Human costs 
should include anxiety and distress caused by the risk of accident as well as by actual 
accidents. In addition, the commission proposes that interlocks will have positive effects 
on public health more generally, mainly from earlier detection of alcoholics and lowered 
consumption of alcohol (Svensson Smith et. al., 2006, p. 92). Finally, one might question 
whether the status quo is the proper baseline – is the current reliance on cars for personal 
transportation beneficial as such so that any obstacle to it should be valued at its full 
monetary cost? 
 If a general requirement of interlocks in all cars should be deemed too costly, 
there are various options for making interlocks mandatory only for certain groups of 
drivers or cars. Convicted drink driving offenders is one obvious category. Young people 
is another possibility. Focusing on cars, possible categories include government vehicles, 
commercial vehicles, taxis, buses, and trucks. Again, the costs of either a general or a 
more limited requirement will depend on technological developments that are hard to 
predict. It is quite possible that in the not so distant future we will have interlocks 
requiring less or no air, less warming time and less service. If so, the cost would decrease 
dramatically. It would seem that some policy of mandatory interlocks is very much a 
practical possibility. While we will have reason to return to the cost aspect, most of the 
moral arguments below are made against the background assumption that mandatory 
interlocks, for some or all cars, is cost-efficient in the wide sense that we consider the 
death and suffering prevented worth the net material cost. 
 Interlocks may or may not include a logging function, registering failed tests. As 
interlocks have historically often been used in experimental programs, collection of data 
has been crucial. It may be thought, however, that such registration threatens privacy. 
Why should the government or anyone else know how many times I have tried to start 
my car after drinking if this is not in itself a crime? This may be a valid concern and it 
should be noted that logging and collection of data is not a necessary feature of 
mandatory interlocks. Interlocks may be designed not to store information of failed 
attempts. As noted above, failed attempts during driving may have to be reported in order 
to deter circumvention. Such reports, however, concern the criminal offence of drink 
driving, as well as circumvention. Respect for privacy can hardly require that these crimes 
not be reported. If information about failed attempts is stored it could be used by 
employers as well as by health care providers to identify people in early stages of 
alcoholism. Even without logging, however, people who repeatedly fail to start their cars 
due to high BAC may themselves realize that their alcohol habits are not healthy. 
RESPONSIBILITY 
According to the current Scandinavian traffic safety paradigm, the ambitious goal is that 
no one be killed or seriously injured in road traffic (Swedish Government, 1996/97). An 
important means to this end is placing responsibility for preventing traffic accidents 
 partly on system designers. “If road users fail to abide by the rules – for example due to 
lack of knowledge, acceptance or ability – or if personal injuries occur, the system 
designers must take additional measures to prevent people from dying or being seriously 
injured.” (our translation, Traffic Responsibility Commission, 2000, p. 69) System 
designers include public and private organizations involved in the design and 
maintenance of roads, vehicles and transportation services, as well as those involved in 
the design and implementation of rules and regulations, education, surveillance, rescue 
work, care and rehabilitation (Swedish Government, 1996/97, p. 17). This paradigm has 
been criticised for eroding individual responsibility (Ekelund, 1999). The possible erosion 
or displacement of responsibility is the first moral objection to mandatory interlocks.  
 Discussions about the balance between individual and societal responsibility wage 
back and forth in several areas, including unhealthy diets and drug use more generally 
(when not driving). It is important to realize that responsibility for a given event or 
problem is not a zero-sum game. Making the police responsible for fighting crime does 
not mean that people become less responsible for the crimes they commit. In certain 
cases, however, shared responsibility could mean less responsibility for each party. To 
evaluate the claim or worry that mandatory interlocks erode individual responsibility, 
therefore, we need to thoroughly analyze the case at hand.  
 Historically, responsibility for traffic accidents has been ascribed to the driver or 
drivers involved. The typical response to an accident is to investigate who among those 
involved is to blame. Interestingly, the narrow focus on individual responsibility can be 
contrasted with the current trend in ‘human factor’ research, which tends to investigate 
aviation rather than road traffic. The same focus on individual responsibility used to be 
prevalent in aviation, i.e. blaming individual pilots for accidents, but recent research has 
shifted interest towards the context in which decisions are made and actions carried out 
(Decker, 2002). This is very appropriate – both aviation and road traffic take place in 
complex systems and consequently accidents in these systems tend to have complex and 
multiple causes. 
 When system designers step in to take responsibility for the context in which 
decisions are made, they may be filling an empty space rather than usurping individual 
responsibility. The responsibility ascribed to system designers is of the forward-looking 
kind, aimed at preventing future accidents rather than distributing blame for past 
accidents. Forward-looking responsibility does include an element of potential blame for 
future accidents, if efforts at prevention turn out to be insufficient. However, it is 
essentially a responsibility to get certain things done, rather than to take blame. This 
should be distinguished from backward-looking responsibility, which is essentially 
focused on distinguishing the immediate causes of an accident and on the 
blameworthiness of those immediately involved (Fahlquist, 2006; Dworkin, 1981). In the 
public debate, both kinds of responsibility ascriptions are common, though not well 
distinguished from each other. Importantly, the two kinds of responsibility can co-exist 
without the one diminishing the other. Indeed, the same kind of responsibility can be 
ascribed to more than one agent without necessarily diminishing responsibility. Under 
the Scandinavian paradigm, drivers are still expected to do their part in preventing 
 accidents by driving responsibly and following traffic rules. This is a forward-looking 
responsibility, since failure to drive safely can incur blame even when no accident occurs. 
 A public policy focusing on assigning backward-looking responsibility to 
individual road users could, for instance, emphasise incarceration. The main worry from 
that perspective is who is to blame for any given accident. If, on the other hand, focus is 
on forward-looking responsibility, alcohol interlocks is a natural way of managing the 
problem of drink driving – system designers are responsible to put an affordable and 
effective systemic solution in place and individual drivers are left with no choice but to 
take their forward-looking responsibility for not driving after drinking. 
 Are there reasons to believe that ascribing forward-looking responsibility for 
accident prevention to system designers will in fact make drivers feel less responsible for 
their driving and so less cautious? Technical systems that are very sophisticated and 
where almost all safety hazards are guarded by automatic systems can erode the 
operator’s feeling of responsibility. This has been observed in airplanes, where familiarity 
with safety devices has led to inattention and complacency (Perrow, 1999, pp. 152-54). 
However, these effects result from safety devices that take over a certain task from the 
pilot or driver and that work continuously through the whole journey, such as a collision 
avoidance system. The interlock, on the other hand, merely establishes whether the 
driver is sober before she can start the engine. This test has no direct effect on the 
driving experience. It does not at all guarantee that the driver is a good one or that the 
safety of the driver and of other road users is automatically protected. There are many 
other safety features and conveniences in cars that do make drivers more passive, such as 
automatic transmission, cruise control and automatic breaking systems. The interlock, on 
the other hand, only prevents people above a certain degree of intoxication from driving 
and is itself passive during the journey. 
 Could it be that despite these considerations, people will come to think of the 
interlock as a general test for being fit to drive, such that they will discount the risks of 
driving tired, stressed or under the influence of other drugs than alcohol? This may of 
course be possible, all sorts of misconceptions can spread, but there seems to be no 
direct reason to expect such a development. It is explicit and obvious that the (standard) 
interlock measures BAC and nothing else. Could people come to think that activities that 
are not protected by interlocks are safe to perform after drinking? Again, this seems 
farfetched. It is obvious that many activities are risky to perform after drinking and it is 
common knowledge that drink driving is a serious problem. Attending to this problem 
should not induce people to lose their everyday experience and knowledge of the 
impairment that comes with intoxication. In sum, the case for claiming that interlocks 
erode individual responsibility seems very weak. 
 Drink driving is a shared, social problem not only in light of its grave aggregate 
consequences, but also in the sense that social norms sometimes indirectly encourage 
drink driving. Alcohol is a natural ingredient in social life for many people. In most 
European and in many other cities, public transportation is extensive and runs at night 
time. It is then possible for most people to engage in social life, drink alcohol, and avoid 
driving. However, in rural areas as well as many cities in the US and elsewhere, there is 
 no convenient and affordable alternative to driving, especially at night. Social norms then 
require one to show up at a bar or restaurant or friend’s place, to drink alcohol, and then 
to get home in some fashion. Responsible people try to assign a designated driver or 
otherwise plan their getting home without driving after drinking, but this is cumbersome 
and it is not surprising in the circumstances that people often drive intoxicated. 
Especially so since every single instance of drink driving with a moderate BAC is not that 
dangerous, despite the severe aggregate outcome. Individuals make their own choices 
about how to spend their nights, but these are made against the background of social 
expectations, city planning, nightlife culture, laws and regulations, and technology. 
Should mandatory interlocks become a fact, social life would simply have to adjust to the 
technical circumstances. It seems likely that this would encourage ways of socializing 
without alcohol, extensive public transportation, and local pubs and other ways of 
meeting more locally. 
 The problem of drink driving, and of impaired driving more generally, is a 
problem where many individuals fail to be responsible enough, with grave aggregate 
consequences, but where punishment of these individuals is very costly and possibly 
morally unjustified. The best way to solve such a problem is to change the background 
circumstances. Directly influencing social norms and increasing the (subjective) 
probability of detection are two ways to combat the problem, but they are insufficient. 
Drivers will continue to make mistakes and break the rules. Profound change will only 
come by conscious design of the system within which individual decisions and mistakes 
are made. Today, the technological design of cars provides drivers with opportunities 
which are illegal and dangerous, such as driving very fast and driving after drinking. The 
danger is not only to the driver, but to other road users as well. While driving after 
drinking is not to be dismissed as totally lacking utility, the right to drive after drinking is 
arguably rather trivial and defeated by other road users’ rights to safety. The government 
should strive to eliminate opportunities that are harmful, dangerous, and relatively 
unimportant. Eliminating the opportunity to drive after drinking by making interlocks 
mandatory, if worth the material costs, seems a perfect example of sound public health 
policy. 
PATERNALISM 
The Interlock Commission explicitly states that the purpose of the interlock is ‘mainly’ to 
protect other road-users from harm (Svensson Smith et. al., 2006, p. 2). The Swedish 
National Road Administration takes the same position (Swedish NRA, 2006:22883, p. 4). 
However, death and injury to drink drivers themselves forms a large portion of the total 
cost of drink driving. Both government entities base their recommendations to 
implement mandatory interlocks on total cost estimates. In an important sense, therefore, 
the desire to avoid self-inflicted harm comprise a large part of the rationale for the policy. 
This raises the spectre of paternalism - limiting the liberty of drink drivers for their own 
good. The charge of paternalism is the second moral objection to mandatory interlocks. 
The Interlock Commission and the Swedish NRA understandably attempt to avoid a 
 complex moral problem by referring to harms to others as the main rationale. However, 
this moral problem should not be avoided, but rather recognized and analyzed. 
 Mandatory interlocks are potentially paternalistic because they limit liberty.1 
People would unquestionably be freer if they did not have to succumb to a BAC test 
before driving. However, liberty-limiting policies are not necessarily paternalistic. All 
criminal laws are liberty-limiting in that people would be freer if they did not have to 
avoid the prohibited activity, be it murder, theft or forgery. Policies are only paternalistic 
in so far as they are supported by certain reasons.2 There are in principle three kinds of 
reasons that may potentially justify mandatory interlocks – direct protection of others 
from harm, avoidance of indirect costs to others from accidents, and direct protection of 
drivers themselves. We will, in turn, discuss these kinds of reasons and whether or not 
invoking them for limiting liberty is paternalistic. 
 The Interlock Commission and the Swedish NRA state that the main reason for 
mandatory interlocks is direct protection of others from harm. Limiting liberty for this 
reason is clearly non-paternalistic. A liberal justice system allows liberty to be exercised 
only within boundaries set by concern for others. Drink driving imposes significant risks 
on others for no comparable benefit and so the first rationale for mandatory interlocks 
should be morally relatively unproblematic. Objections may possibly be raised from a 
libertarian point of view, from which it is always a grave matter who bears the cost of 
reducing risks. It is reasonably clear that libertarians can support prohibiting drink 
driving, since it generates widespread fear and anxiety (Nozick 1974, pp. 73-84). It is not 
clear, however, whether this prohibition may be ensured by technical means, and if so, 
who should bear the cost.  It is true that the costs of mandatory interlocks, both in terms 
of the monetary cost of installation and service of the interlock and in terms of the 
inconvenience of testing, is shared by all, regardless of whether or not they would have 
driven after drinking themselves, and regardless of whether or not they would have been 
victims of drink driving. For more moderate liberals, the fair distribution of costs is 
intertwined with broader questions of fair distribution, and it is taken for granted that 
society should protect its members by general safety measures, even if these impose 
some costs on the collective. This is very reasonable. Some drivers are very skilled and 
cautious and never cause an accident. Nonetheless, these drivers have to share the cost of 
roadside safety barriers and speed cameras. The same drivers could probably be allowed 
to drive through red lights when they deemed it safe to do so – still they are 
inconvenienced by traffic laws shaped to suit the general population. It is an open 
question whether in any one case the costs are worth the benefits. It is generally not 
considered a form of paternalism, however, to force all to share the costs of protecting 
all or some from the mistakes or misbehaving of the few.  
 The second kind of reason for mandatory interlocks is that they prevent the 
incurring of costs on others, cost that are not in the form of direct harms. These indirect 
costs include the psychological cost of knowing that people kill themselves driving after 
drinking, and occasionally seeing it happen. However, the largest indirect cost is arguably 
the material cost to society from drink drivers causing death and injury to themselves, 
with subsequent need for medical attention and diminished productive contribution to 
 society. As noted, these costs form a large portion of total costs (we are not aware of any 
estimates as to how large exactly). Is it paternalistic to count the avoidance of these costs 
as a reason for mandatory interlocks?  If it is, and if paternalism is unacceptable, these 
costs should simply be disregarded when considering the costs and benefits of the policy, 
making it much less cost-efficient.  
 There are good arguments on both sides of this issue. On the one hand, other 
people than the drivers themselves are as a matter of fact made to bear much of the 
material costs of drink drivers harming themselves. On the other hand, it may be argued 
that parts of these costs are voluntarily assumed by society, which need not provide free 
health care to drink drivers and which may charge these drivers for other costs of the 
accident, such as the cost of clearing up the road and costs resulting from delays in 
traffic. Furthermore, it may be argued that the net loss of productive contribution to 
society is something that society has no right to expect or demand from an individual, 
who may at any time chose to end her life, or to live in ways that provide no net 
contribution, if she can do so without infringing on the rights of others. If this 
individualistic argument is correct, the costs incurred by drink drivers harming 
themselves and disrupting traffic are costs that they should themselves bear and so 
accepting the avoidance of these costs as a reason for limiting their liberty is indeed 
paternalistic.  
 Against the individualistic argument it may be argued that most of us want to live 
in a humane society that provides (emergency) health care to all and that we are within 
our rights to create such a society. If so, at least those costs of accidents and care that can 
not be paid for by those directly responsible are quite properly costs to the collective. It 
may also be argued that distinguishing between on the one hand the sober or insured, 
who deserve health care, and on the other hand the intoxicated and uninsured, 
undeserving of health care, would incur administrative costs, possibly as large or larger 
than those of providing care also for the undeserving. If so, it seems that mandatory 
interlocks do in the end prevent the incurring of costs on others.  
 Yet again, the pain one feels when others bleed to death in the street is perhaps 
an other-regarding pain, caused by one’s own sensitivity and so an improper ground for 
limiting liberty. Furthermore, the administrative costs may possibly be charged to the 
undeserving, so that drink drivers would not only bear their own costs, but would also 
pay for the administration that decides whether or not they are deserving, similar to the 
way in which people are sometimes made to bear court costs when they lose a civil court 
case.  
 It seems that the final judgement as to whether the second kind of reason for 
limiting liberty is paternalistic or not depends on whether or not one favours a welfare 
state with free emergency health care and an ambition to avoid unnecessary suffering 
regardless of its cause. This background assumption should be recognized. If we reject 
paternalism and still accept that indirect costs provide grounds for mandatory interlocks 
we should admit that we take the welfare state or a humane society for granted, or 
provide some other explanation for why these costs are relevant. 
  The third kind of reason concerns to the direct protection of drivers themselves. 
We may think that saving people from being killed or injured through their own drink 
driving is a good reason for mandatory interlocks, independently of the resulting material 
cost to society. In terms of cost-benefit analysis, this attitude entails putting the ‘human 
cost’, the loss of quality of life, to drink drivers themselves on the scales. This clearly 
amounts to paternalism in the sense of limiting the liberty of drivers for their own good. 
However, at this point we should distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ paternalism, where 
the former is the limiting of people’s voluntary choices, while the latter is the limiting of 
choices that are substantially involuntary, or not voluntary enough (to warrant protection 
from interference) (see e.g. Feinberg, 1986, chapter 19).  
 Intoxication is a standard case of impairment not only in the context of driving a 
car, but also in the context of making rational decisions. The decision to drive after 
drinking is to some extent impaired and so less than perfectly voluntary. At some degree 
of intoxication, the decision is substantially involuntary – not voluntary enough that 
benevolent usurpation of that decision qualifies as hard paternalism. Moreover, drink 
drivers who are alcoholics may not only be acting involuntarily when they chose to drive, 
but also when they get themselves intoxicated in the first place. This point bears also on 
the indirect costs discussed above – even on an individualistic account it may not be 
paternalistic to avoid indirect costs by limiting liberty, if they are brought about 
involuntarily. Varying estimates indicate that about 50 per cent of drivers killed after 
drinking are alcoholics (Brinkmann, Beike, Köhler, Heinecke & Bajanowski, 2002; 
Swedish NRA, June 2002, p. 8). Still, not all drink drivers are alcoholics and not all 
alcoholics always act substantially involuntarily. Presumably, some drink drivers are 
acting voluntarily (enough). Unless (hard) paternalism is accepted, the costs incurred by 
these drivers would have to be disregarded, again making a policy of mandatory 
interlocks less cost-efficient. Exactly which costs should be disregarded depends on 
where the line is drawn, in this particular context, between voluntary and not voluntary 
enough. 
 Importantly, the fact that there exists a paternalistic rationale for mandatory 
interlocks in no way affects the reasonableness of other rationales. A paternalistic 
rationale is not something that stains a policy so that its mere existence makes the policy 
less justified than it would otherwise have been. The moral status of paternalism 
determines whether or not the protection of the very people whose liberty is limited (and 
who act voluntarily enough) should be accepted as a contributory reason for a given 
policy (Grill 2007; Husak 2003). If it should not, other reasons for that policy remain in 
full force.  
 As already noted, the Interlock Commission and the Swedish NRA have no clear 
position on the issue of paternalism. They point out that they support mandatory 
interlocks ‘mainly’ for other reasons, while they include the costs of death and injury to 
drink drivers themselves in their calculations, without commenting on the possible 
inconsistency. This is perhaps the standard procedure in public policy matters – the least 
controversial reasons are the ones officially cited, while costs are taken into consideration 
regardless of whether or not they are self-inflicted (and voluntary). Such a procedure 
 implicitly entails comprehensive acceptance of paternalism – in the actual policy decision 
the avoidance of voluntary self-harm is assumed to be as valid an aim as the avoidance of 
involuntary self-harm or harm to others. 
 It is far from clear that paternalism as understood here should be rejected. It is 
common to hold that paternalism involves some sort of bad or wrong, but this may 
simply be because it entails a cost in terms of liberty or autonomy. The principled anti-
paternalism that holds that this cost cannot be outweighed by any benefit is uncommon 
and arguably unreasonable. Naturally, if paternalistic reasons are accepted as valid, they 
must still be balanced against other reasons, such as reasons that concern the value of 
liberty. Barring a principled anti-paternalism, the liberty cost of mandatory interlocks 
should most obviously be compared to the corresponding liberty gain. It is not obvious 
that interlocks entail a greater limitation or interference with liberty than do policing and 
punishment. On any one occasion, being forced by the police to undergo a random 
exhalation test is surely more inconvenient and intrusive than being forced by the 
technical design of the car to do the same thing. Random police tests are less intrusive 
only to the extent that they are less frequent. Of course, the less frequent they are, the 
less efficient they are. If comprehensive, efficient policing would be acceptable, so would 
interlocks. Would it? We propose that in the case of drink driving, as well as any other 
activity that should be prevented because of its potential destructiveness on any single 
occasion (and not just because of the accumulative effect of activities of that type), 
extensive policing is in principle acceptable, as long as it is not too costly or too 
inconveniencing. To the extent that interlocks can become cost-efficient and non-
inconveniencing then, they are acceptable, and less intrusive than policing. As for 
imprisonment, it is of course the most severe interference when it is actually carried out. 
Again, the small probability of actually being punished may make a policy of policing and 
punishment less interfering, but to that extent also less efficient. In comparison with the 
amount of liberty taken away by imprisonment or even by heavy fines and/or revocation 
of one’s driver’s licence, the inconvenience of the interlock and the loss of the freedom 
to drive intoxicated seem rather trifling. 
 To sum up, it makes little sense to hold that a policy of mandatory interlocks 
would be paternalistic as such, since it is supported by strong non-paternalistic reasons. 
The fact that it may also be supported by paternalistic reasons does not change this fact. 
The question is, rather, whether paternalistic reasons should be allowed to bear on the 
issue. Such reasons are assumed to be valid in official investigations of the costs of drink 
driving. This seems to us very reasonable, as long as the costs of limiting liberty are not 
forgotten, but properly weighed against other, perhaps more tangible costs. A look at the 
liberty costs of policing and punishment indicates that these costs are comparable to the 
liberty costs of mandatory interlocks. If, contrary to our tentative position, paternalistic 
reasons should be disregarded when deciding whether or not to implement mandatory 
interlocks, the first step should be to look closer at which costs of drink driving are costs 
to drink drivers themselves. If soft paternalism should be acceptable, but not hard 
paternalism, a further important issue is to what extent drink drivers are acting 
 voluntarily, especially in view of the fact that many, in particular at higher BACs, are 
alcoholics. 
CONCLUSION 
Drink driving is a societal problem of great proportions. Punishing drink drivers has 
proven an insufficient measure and it may be questioned if harsh punishment is morally 
justifiable. The interlock offers a technological solution to the problem. The costs are at 
present too high to make a policy of mandatory interlocks in all cars cost-efficient in the 
short run. However, technological development might change this estimate, especially if 
stimulated by large orders. Should a comprehensive program still be too expensive, 
various limited programs are possible. 
 We propose that the responsibility for dealing with drink driving is to a large 
extent the forward-looking responsibility of system designers, including politicians. 
Individuals should take responsibility for their choices, but choices are always made in a 
context and this context can be changed by system design. It is quite consistent to hold 
system designers responsible for the circumstances in which individual choice is made, 
while at the same time holding individuals responsible for the choices they make in these 
circumstances. Furthermore, there seems to be no cause for worrying that greater social 
responsibility for system design will erode the individual feeling of responsibility for 
driving in the case of mandatory interlocks. Unless such a cause can be identified, sound 
public health policy favours social responsibility in this case. 
 We propose that paternalistic reasons may well be acceptable as long as the cost 
in terms of limiting liberty is recognized and considered. By default, the government 
should promote public health when it is cost-efficient to do so and when doing so does 
not involve a net loss of liberty or other important values. Should paternalistic reasons 
nonetheless be rejected as invalid, and certain costs therefore excluded from cost-benefit 
analysis, great care should be taken to distinguish exactly what these costs are. Regardless 
of whether these costs are included or not, there are strong reasons for society to combat 
drink driving, as it presents an obvious risk of harm to others. Given technological 
development, the interlock may soon be the only justifiable as well as the only feasible 
way to seriously diminish drink driving. 
                                                 
1 Joel Feinberg (1986, p. ix) explicitly defines paternalism in terms of 'limiting liberty'. Other definitions 
speak instead of ”interference with liberty of action” (Mill, 1991 [1859], p. 14), ”violation of autonomy” 
(Dworkin, 1983, p. 107), or use similar expressions referring to a diminishing or disrespect of some liberal 
value. 
2 Most discussion of paternalism takes for granted that what is paternalistic is an action, law, institution or 
policy. Whether or not a policy is paternalistic then depends in part on what reasons motivates or justifies 
the policy.  In opposition to this standard account, we assume here that what is paternalistic is the 
invocation of certain reasons for a policy etcetera. For a defence of this account, see Grill (2007). 
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